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EDUCATIONAL FORUM 
COURSES and SEMINARS 
13-14 October: 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SEMINAR, 
Rotorua 
The Bay of Plenty Trades Council 
Industrial Relations Seminar for Union and 
Management representatives will be held 
on 13 and 14 October in the Conference 
Room, Rotorua International Hotel, Rotorua. 
Topics include: Amendments to the Indus-
trial Relations Act (1976) and Trades Unions 
and the Law. Fee: $15. Registrations to 
M r R. A. Rogers, P.O. Box 1523, Rotorua. 
3-6 November: 
TRADE UNION LEADERS SEMINAR 
(2nd of 2 parts) 
The second three-day residential seminar 
for trade union leaders, organised by the 
Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria Uni-
versity of We IIi ng ton, in conjunction with 
the New Zealand Federation of Labour and 
the Combined State Services Organisations, 
will be held from 3 to 6 November at 
Trentham. @ 
REVIEWS 
Worker Control and Influence: A 
Review of the Bullock Report 
B. J . DIVE* 
Introduction 
In the last two or th ree years there has 
been considerable talk in Europe about 
industrial democracy, or employee partici-
pation. In Northern Europe the discussion 
is often about employee representation at 
Board level but for some the real issue is 
worker control. This emerges from con-
sidering recent developments such as: 
Bullock Report on Industrial Democ-
racy, UK, January 1977; Swedish Law 
on Democracy at the Work Place, 
1-1-1977; German Amendment to Co-
determination Act, 1-7-1976; Meidner 
Report on Profit Sharing in Sweden, 
October 1975. 
" MR DIVE works for the Personnel Division oi 
Un1tever N. V ., Rotterdam. His review is based on 
a tal k g iven to the NZIPM In Well ington. 
Bullock Report 
The most relevant of these for New Zea-
land is the Bullock Report which purports 
to be a Report on Industrial Democracy. 
There is always much debate about the 
nature of Industrial Democracy, or any 
form of democracy for that matter, but the 
Bullock Report's viewpoint on this subject 
is uniquely narrow. The blame for that 
though should be most fairly laid upon the 
Labour government which drew up the 
terms of reference in August 1975. 
The Terms of Reference 
The terms of reference given to the 
Bullock Committee already pointed it in a 
certain direction. 
' 'Accepting the need for a radical exten-
sion of industrial democracy in the control 
of companies by means of representation 
on boards of directors, and accepting the 
essential role of trade unions in this pro-
cess . .. " 
Right from the outset then the govern-
ment equated Industrial Democracy with 
board representation. The Bullock Commit-
tee subsequently extended "representation" 
to mean "control " as becomes clear from 
their report. 
Majority I Minori ty Reports 
The Bullock Report is in fact two reports, 
a majority report and a minority report. 
This lack of agreement by the committee 
seriously undermines their findings and 
recommendations. The split reflects the 
very divisiveness of society on this topic of 
worker directors. 
The Majority Report is largely the union 
viewpoint since it is the opinion of three 
trade unionists, three academics and a 
solicitor - seven people who it seems 
have no practical first hand experience of 
company boards. Even so the solicitor, 
M r N. S. Wilson, has also appended his 
"Note of Dissent'' pointing out where he 
disagrees with aspects of the report he 
supports! 
The Minority Report is the work of the 
three senior executives from the private 
sector who were appointed to the commit-
tee. The main difference between the two 
reports is that the majority report favours 
parity between Worker Directors and Share-
holder Directors within a unitary Board 
while the minority report favours the two-
tier board system which is also advocated 
by the EEC Com mission. The minor three 
referred to the majority report as a "far 
from satisfactory or even wise remit.'' 
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1t could be argued that such an indict-
ment from a significant number of the 
committee's own members really means the 
Bullock majority report is a statement of 
failure. However, since it is the majority 
report which is often mistakenly referred to 
as the Bullock Report the rest of my com-
ments apply to the majority report. 
Majority Report 
The major seven first argue that in their 
opinion the best way to achieve wor~er 
involvement is from the top down. Swed1sh 
experience, especially the new law on 
"Democracy at the Work Place" clearly 
contradicts this assumption as I will show. 
Nevertheless, given this assumption they 
next reject the possibility of a statutory 
two-tier system for two reasons : 
1. " 1 n its desire to preserve the free-
dom of management the powers of 
the Board on which the employees 
are represented would be limited 
and thus employee participation 
would be very restricted.' ' 
No evidence is provided by the Bullock 
majority to support their belief, a belief 
contrary to the findings spelt out by the 
EEC Commission in its Green Paper: 
" Employee Participation and Company 
Structure." 
2 . .. It would impose strains and ten-
sions on decision making at top 
level, by requiring the adoption of 
a rigid and alien board structure.' ' 
Alien here means introduced from an-
other country. In the case of two-tiered 
board structures, Germany is the most 
often quoted example. 
An alien board structure is not per se a 
guarantee of failure. When the new co-
determined Board was set up in Germany 
in the coal, iron and steel industry it was 
"alien and rigid.' ' It is now a commonly 
accepted blue print for successful worker 
participation. 
Earlier in their report the major seven 
admit that "many UK companies have de-
veloped a de factor two-tier system." In 
their own words the facts disprove their 
case. 
The crux of the issue is that de facto 
two-tier systems have not yielded the wor-
ker control the UK unionists desire hence 
their preference for suggesting a new uni-
tary board system which is in fact very 
rigid and very alien to present British 
practice. 
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2X plus Y 
1 n chapter 9 of the majority report the 
formula 2X plus Y for board compositions 
is put forward for companies with over 
2,000 employees, "where X represents the 
number of employee representatives and 
also represents the number of shareholder 
representatives and Y is the number of co-
opted Directors. " 
After praising the flexibility of present 
company law which enables companies to 
decide their own number of Directors the 
majority report becomes enmeshed in a 
discussion about numbers of Directors on 
Beards. Their "fallback solution" is for a 
company of 2,000- 9,999 X equals 4; 
10,000-24,999 X equals 5; 
25,000 or more X equals 7. 
" Y Directors should be an uneven num-
ber greater than 1 and form less than 1/3 
of the Board." 
The rigid formula which results from this 
number juggling exercise states that for 
companies of 2,000-1 0,000 employees the 
Board must comprise at least 11 Directors; 
25,000 or more employees, at least 17 
Directors. These proposals would destroy 
the present flexibility of company law con-
cerning the structure and composition of 
company boards. 
Proposed Di rectors' Duties 
In chapter 8 the envisaged Directors' 
Duties are spelt out: 
1. Winding up of company; 
2. Changes in the memorandum and 
articles of association: 
3. Recommendations re dividends; 
4. Changes in the capital structure of 
the company: 
5. Substantial disposals; 
6. Allocation of resources. not 1 n 
1-5 above; 
7. Appointment, removal, control and 
remuneration of management. 
These duties do not demand a unitary 
board, they are perfectly manageable with-
in a two-tier system. Although note 7. has 
been extended to cover more than Dir-
ectors, as at present, and 5. is gloriously 
vague, otherwise they contain nothing new. 
Democracy from the Top Down 
The majority report argues that the best 
way to achieve Industrial Democracy is 
from the top down. This flies in the face 
of British industrial history which, right or 
wrong, has been a struggle from the bottom 
up. British Industrial Relations has been 
and still is a confrontation model usually 
based on a win/ lose power strugg I e. It is 
not based so clearly upon collaboration 
and legislation as in Germany and Sweden. 
On 1st January this year the Swedish Act 
"Democracy at the Work Place" became 
law. Previously, since the famous Decem-
ber Compromise in 1906, the Swedish 
unions had accepted the unrestricted right 
of the employers to direct and allocate 
work and freely hire and dismiss workers. 
Now it is the duty of the employer to in-
form employees beforehand of all matters 
that can influence them (right to be infor-
med). Then if employee representatives do 
not agree with the proposed plans they are 
entitled to negotiate (right to negotiate). 
Finally there is the right to collective 
agreement at national level if local agree-
ment is not reached. 
The aim of this act is to be democratic 
where the work is being done rather than 
simply in the Board room. This is reinforced 
by the fact that there are customarily only 
two Worker Directors on a Swedish Com-
pany Board 
Experience in the one country that has 
known over 160 years of peace, about 40 
years of socialism based upon a virile 
wealth producing private sector and which 
has a collaborative approach to Industrial 
Relations, has apparently been ignored by 
the Bullock Committee. 
Union Status Quo 
A fundamental shortcoming of the major-
ity report is its acceptance of the current 
UK union structure. The existing prolifera-
tion of something like 488 unions with a 
craft/ guild heritage is unworkable in a 
modern industrial state. This is compound-
ed by the fact that Bullock is aiming to 
have trade unionists on the Board not 
employees. Germany has employee repre-
sentation not trade union representation. 
In Sweden worker directors can be union 
members, but they must first be company 
employees. 
The role of the shop steward or need for 
his existence is not discussed. The power 
network of the shop stewards is not touch-
ed by these new proposals. Many contin-
ental Europeans see the shop steward as 
the sand m the oil of UK Industrial Rela-
tions machinery. 
An overhaul of the trade union structure 
and legislation rather than the Board Room 
would seem to be a more logical starting 
point for a Committee of Inquiry on Indus-
trial Democracy in countries such as UK 
and New Zealand. 
Legal Enforcement Inopportune 
It is one of the paradoxes of the 20th 
century that well established political dem-
ocracies can be immature industrial 
democracies. The majority report expects 
to move overnight from a situation of 
minimal participation to an advanced stage 
of employee control. This runs counter to 
Swedish and German experience. In Ger-
many after experimenting for over 20 years, 
and even accounting for last year's exten-
sion of the Co-determination Act to achieve 
parity in compan1es of over 2,000 employ-
ees, ultimate control still lies with the 
shareholders. The majority report believes 
that anything less than immediate worker 
control is not viable. 
In 1975 the Swedish blue collar trade 
unions also argued in favour of worker 
control via the Meidner Report on Profit 
Sharing. The aim was to build up central 
employee funds controlled by the unions. 
This way within 20 years the unions would 
own most of the private sector and would 
therefore control industry. 
Even in Sweden, with its long history of 
collaboration such a proposal provoked 
heated debate. It has been virtually shelved 
in the meantime as unworkable. Yet the 
Bullock Report is even more radical. With-
out Sweden's positive history it advocates 
immediate control - where even Meidner 
would work towards this goal over a 20 
year span. 
Legal enforcement m the field of 
employee relationships has an unhappy 
track record in the UK. The recent fiasco 
over the Industrial Relations Act was a 
lesson which most members of the Bullock 
Committee have either forgotten or chosen 
to ignore. 
No Sociar Research 
In a report signed by three academics 
it is surprising to find no evidence gleaned 
from social research in a discussion about 
the numbers of Directors a company should 
have. The Majority Report is pre-occupied 
with numbers only to the extent of avoiding 
the possibility of a split vote. The effective-
ness of working groups or the findings of 
group dynamics are nowhere referred to. 
Their premise seems to be that people 
are never absent from Board Rooms on 
acr.n••nt of business or sickness. Finally 
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even if the numbers they propose are 
workable (and they do not seem able to 
conceive how Boards operate in companies 
of more than 25,000) then this wi II be a 
laudable by-product. 
One Sided Concessions 
Given the terms of reference and the 
two reports it is arguable that the Bu I lock 
Commission is largely a political Instru-
ment Despite this the majority report is 
politically and psychologically unrealistic. 
While leaving the current un1on network 
unchallenged, and if anything substantially 
reinforced, the majority report does not 
hesitate to dismantle the Company Board 
Structure. It acknowledges that quite a 
number of current Directors will lose their 
present positions. If the power of the shop 
steward is apparently sacrosanct it is rather 
optimistic to expect only Directors to yield 
power. As indicated above the whole umon 
structure needs revamping and a more 
astute Bullock Report would have noted 
that. 
All the concessions have to made by 
one party, the present Board of Di rectors. 
Consequently, even 1f one could agree that 
the substance of the majority report was 
sound , it is still tactically naive. It is 
therefore already encountering the intense 
opposition which scuppered the Industrial 
Relations Act. 
Value Judgements of Committee 
In chapter 4 the majonty report carefully 
outlines the different viewpoints favouring 
various forms of Industrial Democracy. 
Those it rejects are on the grounds of 
insufficient supporting evidence. As the 
majority report rightly points out these var-
ious viewpoints are really based upon 
opinion not fact. Most are about possible 
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future developments, not the present situ-
ation . 
But after identifying and rejecti ng the 
value judgements of others, the maJori ty 
report puts forward i ts own recommenda-
tions which illogically are also based upon 
opinion not fact. The majority report is 
speck led with the phrase " we believe," 
from which it emerges that the majority 
report is itself no more than a poi nt of 
view probably more untried and unproven 
than those other opinions so summanly 
discounted. 
Conclusion 
The Commission was asked to consider 
how workers could be represented on the 
Boards of Directors not produce a blue 
print for worker cont rol. Its partisan reports 
are a disservice to Industria l Democracy. . 
The majority report (written by non-
Directors) clouds many important issues. 
Nevertheless this should not distract us 
from the fact that we still have to build a 
successfu I Industrial Democracy. 
I believe Personnel Managers in parti-
cular have a critical role to play in estab-
1 is hi ng a realistic, coherent and effective 
Industrial Democracy. In a period of in-
creasing role confusion they straddle the 
interests of employees and employers. The 
importance of their task was put in sharp 
perspective by Lord Bullock himself on 27 
January, talking about employee represen-
tation : 
" We are at the beginni ng of a 
change which . . . is comparable with 
the managerial revolution earlier this 
century which transferred the effective 
control of companies from the share-
holders to those employees who man-
age the business. " <!) 
The Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Heavy Engineering 
Industry. 
R. F. GAPES* 
Presumably as a result of continuing 
difficulties and recent stoppages in the 
Heavy Engineering Industry, especially on 
such projects as the new Bank of New 
Zealand building in Wellington. a Commis-
sion of Inquiry was appointed on 8 Nov-
ember 1976. In accordance with the Com-
missions of Inquiry Act 1908, the Commis-
sion, Messrs R. K. Davison and J. W. 
Dempsey, were to enquire into and report 
upon: 
(a) The factors that had contributed to 
the closure of individual undertak-
ings in the Heavy Engineering 
Industry over the last decade; 
(b) How any such factors or other 
matters prejudicial to the continued 
viability and efficiency of existing 
undertakings within the Industry 
can or should be removed or 
avoided; 
(c) Any associated matters which the 
Commission may deem to be rele-
vant to the general purpose of the 
Inquiry." 
An extension of time was granted such 
that the Commission reported on 2 May 
1977, having held public hearings in 
Christchurch. Wellington and Auckland 
during February and March 1977. Seven-
teen companies were cited, together with 
the New Zealand Engineering Employers 
Association, five Unions and the Wellington 
Boilermakers Society Inc. Appendices to 
the Report set out the names of 46 witnes-
ses and numerous other companies and 
parties who contributed to the enquiry. 
From an industrial relations viewpoint , 
the key conclusion of the Commission 
stems from substantial evidence concerning 
union activities in cases of the closure of 
11 boilermaking undertakings carried on by 
~ine companies, closures which took place 
tn the last decade. In this key matter, the 
Commission concludes, "It is our opinion 
that the cause of the closure of the com-
panies which gave evidence before us as 
• I 
earl1er referred to, was declining profitab-
-
• R. F. GAPES is a Consultant In Engi neering and 
Management, and Deputy Chairman of tho Auck-
fand Techn ical I nsti tute. He is co-author of the 
S tudy of the Heavy Eng ineeri ng Industry mentioned 
tn tn ts rev1ew . 
ility influenced in varying degrees by all the 
problems affecting profitability as discussed 
earlier in this Report but due primarily to 
the disruptive tactics and restrictive prac-
tices imposed upon them by certain sec-
tions of the Auckland and Wellington 
Boilermakers Union." 
The bulk of the report of the Commission 
outlines in some detail the specific back-
ground of operations and experiences in 
undertakings which had difficu lty in the 
industrial relations field. Of the companies 
which closed down operations and which 
made submissions before the Commission. 
all listed industrial disharmony as the prime 
cause of the closures. The Commission 
noted that in some instances industrial 
practices put into effect by some boiler-
makers have been unjustified, disruptive 
and blatantly in breach of both the Award 
under which they claim to have protection 
and of Industrial Law. 
It is interesting to note some of the 
points reported. Disruptive practices fell 
into categories i ncl ud i ng 
(a) Demarkation Disputes; such as ar-
guments with members of the 
Engineers Union over who should 
work on plate of a thickness great-
er than Va ", refusal to use over-
head cranes. and claims to all 
welding work. 
{b) Refusal to follow lawful 
es; including u n lawfu I 
interrerence with lawful 
of employees, and the 
llwork to rule." 
procedur-
go-slows, 
dismissal 
so-called 
(c) Restrictive practices; including re-
fusal to work overtime, mysterious 
disappearance of working drawings, 
setting fire to welding rod pack-
ages, producing smoke nuisances, 
the union nominating which mem-
bers would work overtime, absen-
teeism on Fridays followed by 
attendance on Saturdays for work 
at extra rates, insistence on a 
Boilermakers Union nominee being 
engaged for employment ahead of 
any other member of the Union 
(which is said to have enabled the 
Union to in filtrate troublemakers 
into company operations). 
The Commission reported that such 
problems were most common in the Au ck-
land and Wellington areas and noted that 
elsewhere there were fi rms who had rela-
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tively l1tlte trouble Further, the Commis-
sion did recognise other factors in declin-
ing profitability and (venturing outside the 
purely industrial relations' aspect) one 
notes that the Report includes some 
thoughts on the tendenng system in New 
Zealand and on problems caused by con-
tract escalation and the rnability of con-
tractors to recover excessive costs due to 
unexpected labour cost rises . Readers who 
are interested in the wider aspects, wi II 
find that the Commission drew extensively 
upon the Industry Study concluded in 
March 1976 for the M mister of Trade and 
ndustry, entitled " The Heavy Engineering 
Industry in New Zealand," authored by R. 
F. Gapes (Engineer) and W. D. Rose 
(Economist). Both the Report of the Com-
mission and the Industry Study noted that 
firms reported detenoratrng labour effici-
ency and considered there was a decline 
in productivity noticeable, even purposeful, 
in relation to activities involving boiler-
makers. Both felt that amalgamation of 
unions is a solution, for it seems that the 
fragmentat1on of the Boilermakers Union 
leads to opportunities for disruption wh1ch 
are not generally acceptable in the com-
munity. In specific reference to the Indus-
trial Relat1ons Act 1973, the Commission 
Report states, " It 1s our v1ew that it is not 
the procedures that are defective but the 
attitudes of certain parties to the observ-
ance of those procedures. No words in 
any statute or award can compel a party 
to follow a procedure if that party is deter-
mined to break the law and refuse to do 
so. We are of the opinion that no change 
in the provisions of the Industrial Relations 
Act are required to meet the present situa-
tron, rather that it is the attitudes of the 
parties to the observance of those proced-
ures that will determine their success or 
failure." Representatives of the Unions in 
general agreed with the principles of con-
sidering a Metal Trades Federation and 
increased consultation between unions. It 
was pointed out that there is a natural 
progression to the reduction of the number 
of unions in New Zealand. All parties 
agreed that amalgamation of Unions should 
be voluntary and not compulsory. 
The Commission recommended that 
Industrial Relations Committees be estab-
lished (as descnbed in the Northern and 
Wellington Boilermakers Awards) and dealt 
In general terms with suggested improved 
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selection and trainrng procedures for sup-
ervisors and improvement in management 
training. It is significant that the Industry 
Study earl1er had come to similar conclu-
SIOns, in the sense that Joint Consultative 
Committees or Works Councils were 
recommended along with an Industrial 
Relations Off1cer temporarily established to 
encourage and assist firms in the setting 
up of Consultative Councils. The s1gnificant 
point lying behind all this seems to be, 
that contacts at individual levels between 
management and employees need (in 
themselves) to have sufficient successful 
transactions to be reasonably worthwhile 
activities. Although not of momentous pro-
portions themselves, such contacts are im-
portant in that the pay-off for all is in the 
area of "changed attitudes." To quote from 
the Industry Study, " The communication . 
and the sense of involvement will stand 
all parttes rn good stead when more difficult 
problems anse. as they inevitably will do 
from time to time. One point wh1ch follows 
from this, ts that a particular pressure 
group (be it union or employer onented) 
would then find it harder to monopolise 
the constricted lines of communication 
which result from any established situation 
of confrontation." 
In summary therefore , it seems the Com-
mission was satisfied, from the evidence 
given, that specific and u nlawfu I actions 
had substantially aided the closure of im-
portant engineering works and that such 
matters as amalgamation of unions and 
improved attitudes (achieved voluntarily if 
poss1ble} are essential. Those interested 
especially in these Industrial Relations 
aspects should not divorce from their 
thoughts the consideration given to import-
ant matters such as proper long-term plan-
ning and the balancing of load and capacity 
in the Industry. Without some reasonable 
expectation of a satisfactory level of work, 
neither employers nor employees find 
themselves in an environment conducive to 
continuing smooth relationships. The 'feast-
or-famine' work conditions which have pre-
vailed in this Industry have not contributed 
to good industrial relations, and there are 
those who consider this a prime reason for 
the Boilermakers Union / Management dif-
ficulties encountered and so extensively 
documented by the Commission of In-
quiry. ® 
BOOKNOTES 
A. J. Geare, Wage Payment Sys-
tems, Methuen, New Zealand, 1977 
It is refreshing to have Alan Geare accept 
money as a motivator. Only the most en-
lightened human relationists can stomach 
this view and yet it is inherent in job con-
tracts, new appointments. negotiations, 
union discontent and executive job move-
ment. In fact everyone, from the Governor-
General down to the young terti a ry bursary 
student is basically self-seeking in terms 
of remuneration . 
All payment systems have to contain ele-
ments which appear to be psychologically 
satisfying. Thus we become involved in 
time rates, merit systems, group systems, 
profit sharing, measured day work and pro-
ductivity bargaining. Alan Geare deals with 
all of these in a most practical fashion , not 
only describing the systems, but also dis-
cussing the pros and cons of each system. 
Most of the schemes emerge as systems 
which are designed to please someone. 
Work forces appreciate a scheme that 
seems to benefit them. Managers appre-
ciate systems which minimise the demands 
on company rncome. 
Two social issues seem to have com-
pletely fouled up the various wage pay-
ment systems. One is equal pay for women 
which has sorely distorted the economy to 
the detriment of women in terms of cost of 
living. The other is inflation which effective-
ly destroys one's belief that merit is being 
rewarded - because merit disappears in 
general wage increases of singular magni-
tude. 
Especially useful are chapters nine to 
eleven giving notes of special value to 
personnel people on work study, job evalu-
ation. and installing a new payment sys-
tem. 
This book is recommended reading for 
anyone dealing with payment systems and 
interesting reading for managers and aca-
demics. 
J. C. ELMSLY 
BOOKS RECEIVED 
Davis, L. E., Cherns, A. B., and asso-
ciates, The Quality of Working Life, volume 
one: 'Problems, Prospects and the State 
of the Art; 450 pp, volume two: 'Cases and 
Commentary, · 387 pp., New York, The Free 
Press, 1975, $NZ7.20 per volume. 
Rrchardson. R. C., Collective Bargaining 
by Objectives, Englewood Cliffs, New Jer-
sey: Prentice-Hall, 1977. 
Reminder: 
ANNUAL GENERAL 
MEETING 
The Annual General Meeting of the 
Industrial Relations Society of New 
Zealand Incorporated will be held in 
the Discovery Room. Royal Internat-
ional Hotel, Victoria Street West, 
Auckland on 
MONDAY, 29th AUGUST, 1977 
commencing at 6.00 p.m. 
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The Industrial Relations Society of 
New Zealand Incorporated 
was founded in 1974 by a group of people drawn from management, 
government, trade unions, the legal profession and the universities, 
who saw a need to improve communications among those working in 
all areas of industrial relations and to promote a wider understanding 
of industrial relations problems and practice in New Zealand. 
The primary aims of the Society are to organise and foster discussion, 
research, education and publications within the field of industrial 
relations , and to bring together industrial relations practitioners to 
exchange ideas, share experiences, and develop greater understand-
ing of industrial relations matters. 
Enquiries concerning membership of the Society and subscriptions 
for the New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations should be 
addressed to : 
THE SECRETARY, 
Industrial Relations Society of New Zealand Incorporated, 
P.O. Box 1341 , Auckland , New Zealand. 
The New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations is the official journal 
of the Industrial Relations Society of New Zealand Incorporated. 
However, views expressed by contributors to the Journal are their 
own and do not necessarily reflect the views either of the editors or 
of the Society. The Journal appears three times a year, in May, August 
and November and regular features include: 
+ Articles that contribute to the advance of knowledge directly related to 
the practice of industrial relations in New Zealand or to the development 
of theoretical perspectives on industrial relations issues; the editors will 
strive to maintain some balance between the presentation of research 
findi ngs and more speculative articles: 
+ A Chronicle of current industrial relations events in New Zealand and 
comments by regional correspondents in Auckland, Welli ngton, Christ-
church and, for a vie'<.J of the Trans-Tasman scene, Sydney; 
+ Reviews of recent cases in industrial law and discussion of topical 
legislative matters ; 
+ Book reviews and research summaries; 
+ Opinion pieces from members and correspondents, includ ing literary 
contributions; 
+ An educational forum givmg notice of forthcoming meetings, confer-
ences, seminars. educational programmes and other activities of interest 
to New Zealand readers. 
Arti cles and contributions for the Journal should be submitted not less 
than six weeks prior to the date of issue and addressed to: 
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THE EDITOR, 
New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Centre for Continuing Education, 
University of Auckland, 
Private Bag, 
Auckland, 
NEW ZEALAND. 
